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Corey Lang * and Patrick Cavanagh
University of Rhode Island

ABSTRACT
This paper uses the hedonic method to examine the external effects of Rhode Island’s
voluntary brownfield program. We hypothesize that housing price impacts are a
combination of valuation of environmental improvement and response to information
disclosure initiated by remediation. The results indicate that housing prices decline after
nearby remediation, suggesting incomplete information about the presence of risk.
Further, we find empirical evidence that price impacts and the degree of incomplete
information are different across neighborhoods. Specifically, low housing value
neighborhoods experience price declines following remediation while high value
neighborhoods experience price increases, leading to an overall regressive impact.
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1 INTRODUCTION
A brownfield is a property that is polluted or contaminated with hazardous waste, which
hinders its redevelopment or reuse. Proponents of brownfield remediation point to many benefits
of cleanup: health and safety of neighborhood residents, revitalization of urban areas, and
mitigation of urban sprawl. The Government Accountability Office (2005) estimates that
450,000 brownfields exist nationwide in the United States, and many cities and states have
ongoing agendas to remediate their sites.
Brownfield prevalence is unequally distributed by income, race, and ethnicity, which
raises concerns about environmental justice. This type of unequal exposure is common and well
documented across criteria air pollutants, toxic air pollutants, and hazardous waste sites (e.g.,
United Church of Christ 1987, Brooks and Sethi 1997, Shaikh and Loomis 1999, Apelberg et al.
2005, Pastor et al. 2005). 1 Given unequal exposure, environmental improvement could lead to
disproportional benefits for disadvantaged groups, as found by Bento et al. (2015) in the case of
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. Thus, a program aimed at cleaning and developing
brownfields would intuitively have a disproportionately positive impact on low-income and
minority communities. However, this progressive outcome relies on several assumptions,
including that information about environmental quality is equal across neighborhoods.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the external impacts of brownfield remediation in
the residential property market and to examine heterogeneous impacts across neighborhoods and
the distributional consequences of that heterogeneity. We examine a voluntary brownfield
remediation program in Rhode Island 2, in which the state offered to negate liability in exchange
for owners assessing and, if necessary, remediating property to comply with toxicity regulations.
Unlike a superfund site, properties may not be known to be brownfields until there is an
environmental assessment as part of a sale or redevelopment. There is no database of existing
brownfields in Rhode Island, only records of those that have been remediated. Thus, the process
of remediation can reveal information previously unknown about a specific property, as well as
raise concerns about risks of nearby properties. The presence of this incomplete information,
1

An additional set of papers seeks to disentangle whether it is inequality at the siting stage or if household mobility
and housing market dynamics lead to the unequal exposure observed in the cross section (e.g., Been 1994, Depro et
al. 2015).
2
The State of Rhode Island is one of the oldest industrial centers in the United States, staking claim to Birthplace of
the American Industrial Revolution with the opening of the first American water-powered cotton spinning mill in
1789. Not surprisingly, most industrial activity is gone, but its remnants remain.
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how it differs across neighborhoods, and how it impacts the house price response of remediation
and distribution of benefits are the central research questions of this paper.
We observe 225 brownfields identified and cleaned over the period 2003-2013 and
43,787 housing transactions within two kilometers (km) of those remediated sites. Our empirical
method to assess the property value impacts of remediation is a dose-response model, in which
we regress prices on a continuous measure of brownfield density. Our model also includes
census block group and year fixed effects, as well as time-varying neighborhood variables such
foreclosure rates. Prior work on brownfield remediation (e.g., Haninger et al. 2017) has used
difference-in-differences methods, essentially comparing properties near a site to those further
away before and after remediation. In our sample, however, brownfields are often tightly
clustered – 79% are within 1 km of another site – which makes identifying a control group
difficult. 3
Results from our basic model suggest that remediation reduces nearby property values.
The marginal effect of a single remediation 1 km from a house is -1.0%. If a house was just 0.5
km from the brownfield site, the price impact would be -2.0%. Estimated impacts can be a
combination of valuation of environmental improvement, consequences of information learned
from cleanup, site characteristics, reuse choices, preference-based sorting following cleanup, and
bias resulting from unobserved variables. Given our modeling strategy and additional empirical
findings including immediate capitalization and consistency of impacts across site and reuse
types, we argue that the price impact is composed only of a valuation effect and an information
effect. As an illustration of this intuition, Figure 1 presents a hedonic price schedule for
environmental quality. 4 Suppose residents and potential buyers believe the environmental quality
to be 𝑧𝑧3 , however these beliefs are incorrect and the actual environmental quality is 𝑧𝑧1 .

Brownfield remediation improves environmental quality to 𝑧𝑧2 , but also reveals the true baseline
environmental quality. On net, remediation reduces housing prices from 𝑃𝑃(𝑧𝑧3 ) to 𝑃𝑃(𝑧𝑧2 ). In this
light, we interpret our basic results as evidence that remediation led to significant information
revelation, and the negative impact outweighed any valuation effect on sales prices of nearby

3

Despite the limitations, we also estimate difference-in-differences models to make sure our modeling assumptions
are not driving the results. We present these results in the online appendix and conclusions are similar.
4
For a complete discussion of the underlying theory that leads to the hedonic price schedule, refer to Taylor (2017).
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properties. This conclusion is supported by other empirical findings of information disclosure
affecting the implicit price of different amenities (e.g., Pope 2008, Guignet 2013).
To explore distributional impacts and environmental justice concerns, we examine how
house price responses may be different in neighborhoods with different socioeconomic
characteristics. We build on recent work showing how the housing market is segmented
(Kuminoff and Pope 2013, Landvoigt et al. 2015) and examine how the impacts of remediation
may differ by market segment. Specifically, we investigate price responses in low, medium and
high priced neighborhoods, and we posit that valuation and information may be different across
these segments. These results suggest that remediation leads to price declines in low home value
neighborhoods, whereas in high home value neighborhoods remediation leads to price increases.
Further, in low value areas, proximity to unremediated brownfields does not impact prices, but in
high value areas sales prices are less when near an unremediated brownfield. Together, these
results give support and nuance to our conclusion that incomplete information is affecting price
impacts. Low value areas appear to be less informed about existing brownfields and remediation
reveals information, which leads to price declines (same as the example above illustrated using
Figure 1). However, high value areas appear to be more informed about existing brownfields and
valuation of remediation dominates the price effect of information. On Figure 1, this would be a
move from 𝑧𝑧3 to 𝑧𝑧4 . Further, these results indicate adverse distributional consequences of

remediation as low-income and minority households disproportionately live in low house value
neighborhoods.
This article makes several contributions to the literature. First, this article serves as an
evaluation of a brownfield remediation program, of which evidence is scant. 5 Voluntary
brownfield remediation programs are common across many states and large cities, and thus
empirical evidence on their effects is needed. Using data from Chicago, Linn (2013), which is
the most closely related study to ours in terms of design, estimates that the marginal effect of a
single remediation in the prior year 1 km away is a 0.2% price increase. Haninger et al. (2017)
find large, positive property value impacts of brownfield remediation, ranging from 5% to 15%,
using a national sample of sites that received an EPA grant for cleanup. Why may our results
differ in sign and what can be learned from differences? In contrast to this paper, Haninger et al.

5

However, many evaluations of superfund remediation exist (e.g., Messer et al. 2006, Kiel and Williams 2007,
Greenstone and Gallagher 2008, Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins 2013, Mastromonaco 2014).
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examine sites that are toxic enough to warrant federal cleanup funding. 6 Thus, in their case, it
may be less likely for remedial activity to be a source of new information for nearby residents.
Further, the EPA awards grants based in part on community involvement and allows
communities to have input into reuse; officials in EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency
Response feel this may be a critical difference between programs based on their experience
(Cooper et al. 2015). Additionally, federal cleanup money is often coupled with activities like
community outreach and promotion of development, and job training grants can be awarded to
cleanup communities too (EPA 2014), all of which could factor into estimated benefits. In
contrast, under voluntary programs, the decision to remediate is often driven by development
rather than toxicity, and the discovery of contamination may be new information. The context of
Linn (2013) is another voluntary brownfields program that targets less toxic sites and exchanges
liability for remediation. The magnitude of Linn’s estimates are much smaller than Haninger et
al., which corroborates the idea that funding, community engagement or the degree of toxicity
are important determinants of price effects.
Second, this paper contributes to our understanding of how environmental policy can be
regressive, a concern notably raised by Baumol and Oates (1988). When a policy is place-based,
the main concern is that property values rise, but low-income renters do not receive the
capitalization benefits and may be priced out of a neighborhood and suffer a welfare loss with
relocation (Fullerton 2011). 7 In contrast to these indirect means of regressive outcomes, this
paper finds that environmental improvement reduces property values in low-income
neighborhoods and increases values in high income areas. For the lowest income quintile, the
ratio of annualized change in home value resulting from remediation to income is -2.5%; for
highest income quintile, this same ratio is +0.5%. In contrast, Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins
(2013) examine distributional impacts of superfund remediation and find that low value homes
appreciate more than high value homes after cleanup. One possible explanation for this
divergence in results is incomplete information about existing contamination in the case of
brownfields, which is unlikely for a superfund site.

6

Using the website “Cleanups in my Community” (http://www2.epa.gov/cleanups/cleanups-my-community), we
found little overlap (<5%) between our sample sites and those that received EPA grants.
7
The empirical evidence supporting this idea, however, is mixed (Sieg et al. 2004, Grainger 2012, Bento et al. 2015,
Lang 2015).
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Lastly, hedonic valuation is a workhorse model in environmental economics, and
typically estimated coefficients are interpreted as marginal willingness to pay (MWTP).
However, there are myriad factors that can cause hedonic coefficients to separate from valuation
(Kuminoff and Pope 2014), and this paper adds empirical evidence that casts doubt on this
interpretation. Currie et al. (2014) find that property value impacts do not reflect the full extent
of health impacts caused by manufacturing plants. Guignet (2013) finds that property prices only
respond to water quality variation when home-specific well tests are done. Pope (2008) and
Walsh and Mui (2017) show that the hedonic price gradient changes after mandatory information
disclosure. Given health and safety concerns of brownfields, certainly the welfare of nearby
residents improves with remediation, all else equal. However, our findings indicate that price
changes do not reflect health and safety improvements and this wedge is likely driven by
incomplete information.

2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Brownfields
A brownfield is a property that is polluted or contaminated with hazardous waste, which
hinders its redevelopment or reuse. 8 In Rhode Island, the most common sources of
contamination for brownfield sites are heavy metals (predominantly Arsenic and Lead),
petroleum related byproducts (from leaking storage tanks and spills), Polychlorinated Biphenyls
(from electrical transformers and substations), and historical remnants of the state’s
manufacturing background.
Inorganic heavy metals remain and the soils become sinks for these contaminants to leach
into proximate ecosystems and food chains (Wuana and Okieimen 2011). In Rhode Island,
industrialization started in the late 18th century with the onset of textile mills harnessing the
power of local waterways. These mills later supported the manufacturing of tools, alloys and
jewelry – industries that resulted in lasting heavy metal contamination. The high concentration of
historical manufacturing centers along with the toxicity and mobility of contaminants over a two
century period point to the large degree of uncertainty that investigators, regulators, and land
owners encounter when attempting to sufficiently mitigate risk to humans and the natural
environment.
8

See www.epa.gov/brownfields for more information.
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Hazardous wastes harbored within brownfields can have a predictable effect on the
people that come into contact with them and their surroundings: unusual rates and rare forms of
cancer (Cogliano 1998), birth defects and abnormal human development (Croen et al. 1997), and
learning disabilities (Ciesielski et al. 2012).

2.2 Remediation
Banks, lenders, and corporate property buyers typically require real estate to have a site
investigation on record before going forward with any transactions or development that may
carry the risk of a hazardous waste liability. A site investigation is the initial assessment and
testing of a property that determines if there are contaminants present and whether those
contaminants exceed critical thresholds. These requirements change from state to state but are
commonly based on the EPA’s recommendations. If a contaminant is found to exceed the state
threshold, the site is deemed hazardous and in need of cleanup (remediation) under state or
federal law. Cleanup typically takes less than six months.
Remediation efforts aim to clean up the source of pollution and otherwise isolate the
pathways in which the contaminants could affect humans, with the ideal goal being to restore the
environmental health of the site to its pre-polluted state. Additionally, remediation can allow for
the reuse of the land that would otherwise sit abandoned and hazardous.
The historic nature of many brownfields can lead to a contaminated parcel of land
changing hands one or more times, which creates a legal buffer between the current land owner
and the historic polluter. The contemporary land owner is held legally liable for the cleanup costs
associated with any hazardous waste discovered on their property, regardless of whether they
were aware of the waste at the time of their purchasing the property.

2.3 Rhode Island’s voluntary brownfield program
State governments focus on brownfields that are not so imminently hazardous as to
warrant federal attention, but still present an environmental risk. Further, states and others see
brownfield remediation and redevelopment as an important strategy in revitalizing urban
neighborhoods and reducing urban sprawl. State level equivalents of the EPA manage cleanup
efforts within their jurisdiction and will sometimes establish a voluntary brownfields program.

7

Voluntary programs have been accredited for a notable increase in the number of brownfield
cleanups since their introduction (Linn 2013).
In Rhode Island, the Site Remediation and Brownfields Program was created in 1993 by
the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management (RIDEM) Office of Waste
Management (OWM). 9 This program offers some legal protection for land owners that report a
release of contaminants to RIDEM and agree to follow and complete the official remediation
process outlined in the Rules and Regulations for the Investigation and Remediation of
Hazardous Material Releases. Properties can be brought into the program either by voluntary
entry for purpose of owners avoiding liability or by performing an environmental site assessment
to clear the way for a real estate transaction. While it is voluntary for property owners to enter
the program, this is misleading. After a site investigation has been conducted, the results are
required to be reported to RIDEM. Thus, the choice not to enter the program would likely have
legal ramifications. Once in the program, RIDEM works with the property owner to determine
the best path forward that both minimizes the risk of human exposure and keeps cleanup costs at
acceptable levels.
Given the possible ignorance of current owners over the toxicity of their property, nearby
residents may be uninformed as well, and Rhode Island’s program seeks to address this.
Contaminated site owners are required by RIDEM to publicly notify the owners of land parcels
that abut a brownfield parcel on two separate occasions throughout the remediation process. 10
The first time, abutters are notified of a pending site investigation to further investigate a
suspected contamination. When the investigation is completed, the results of any findings are
presented to abutters in the second notification, along with several remedial alternatives that are
likely to take place. There is no public notification when remediation is complete. 11 However,
abutters have no legal obligation to inform prospective buyers (as in Pope 2008). While formal
notification stops at current abutters, information is likely to spread further through observation
of cleanup and through banks, which monitor areas of potential liabilities.

9

For more information, see www.dem.ri.gov/brownfields/default.htm
See rule 7.07 of the Rules and Regulations for the Investigation and Remediation of Hazardous Material Releases
http://www.dem.ri.gov/pubs/regs/regs/waste/remreg11.pdf
11
There are stipulations for special circumstances, such as the repurposing of a brownfield for use as a school, that
warrant more extensive public outreach.
10
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3 DATA
3.1 Brownfield data
Brownfield remediation data were gathered from the public record, provided by the
RIDEM OWM. We collected data on all sites remediated from October 2003 to March 2013.
Prior to October 2003, the EPA did not require states to make data on remedial actions publically
available, and RIDEM chose not to keep records. 12 The RIDEM data included the name of each
site, the approximate street address, site acreage, general source of contamination, and the date
that the letter of completion was issued. The dataset did not include entry dates into the state
brownfield remediation program. Combining address records from RIDEM with Google Maps,
Google Earth, plat and parcel maps and tax assessor databases, we were able to identify exact
longitude and latitude at the center of each brownfield parcel.
During our time range, a total of 225 sites were remediated and this forms our sample.
Figure A1 in the online appendix shows the geographic distribution of the sample brownfields.
The highest concentration of brownfield sites is in the urban corridor of Providence. Other areas
of high concentration tend to be located near major rivers, such as the Blackstone flowing south
from Massachusetts into Providence, and along Narragansett Bay, both reflecting historical
patterns of industry.
RIDEM identified sites by their prior function or the primary source of contamination.
Using this, we group all sample sites into three broad classifications: ‘Historical’ meaning a site
used industrially many decades prior, ‘Synthetic compounds’ including heavy metals and
Polychlorinated Biphenyls, and ‘Petroleum’ indicating oil contamination usually from
underground storage tanks. Historical is the largest comprising 48%; Synthetic compounds and
Petroleum make up 18% and 15%, respectively. The remaining 19% are either classified as
something uncommon or unclassified.
To complement the source contamination data, we manually collected reuse data. Using
Google Maps, we determined how each sample remediated site is currently being used. 42% are
used commercially and 18% are used for industrial purposes. 25% are redeveloped into
residential areas or schools; the remediation burden is greater for this reuse because standards are

12

Not having remediation data prior to 2003 is a limitation of our study. We guard against prior remediation biasing
our results by including census block group fixed effects, which control time-invariant neighborhood attributes, such
as pre-2003 remediation.
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more stringent. 15% were either classified as something uncommon or had not yet been
developed. Table A1 in the online appendix summarizes the distribution of our sample into
source contamination and reuse categories, as well as the transition frequency between groups.

3.2 Housing data
Our housing data were purchased from Warren Group and include nearly all Rhode
Island transactions between October 2003 and February 2013. We have transactions data back to
January 2000, which are used to measure pre-sample neighborhood average prices as described
in Section 4. The data offer information on sales price, date of transaction, street address, living
square feet, lot size, year of construction, number of bedrooms, full and half bathrooms, and
whether or not the unit has a pool, fireplace, air conditioning or view of the water. Sales prices
were adjusted for inflation using Federal Housing Finance Agency’s monthly Housing Price
Index and brought to February 2013 levels. To get latitude and longitude, we geocoded all
addresses to coordinates using the Rhode Island GIS E-911 geolocater. 13 Using GIS, we
calculated the Euclidian distance to all brownfields.
To build our main sample, we include only transactions within 2 km of a site in order to
exclude neighborhoods and properties dissimilar to those that experience remediation. We
include only arm’s length transactions of single family homes. Lastly, we dropped sales with
prices less than $25,000 and greater than $10 million. The final sample is 43,787 transactions
representing 34,035 unique single family properties.
We additionally added a set of spatial amenity variables using GIS. While foreclosure
properties are not included in the main sample, we calculate the number of foreclosed properties
per block group-year in order to control for price spillovers from those properties – consistent
with Harding et al. (2009). Additionally, we calculate proximity to several time-invarient
neighborhood features: highway exit, village center, major river, large lake, coastline, industrial
center, Enterprise Zone, and to downtown Providence. One additional distance was taken to the
nearest pre-sample CERCLIS site. Only sites on CERCLIS before the sample period began were
included in order to gain a sense of how close each transaction was to a pre-sample hazardous
waste site that warranted federal level attention.

13

Available at http://www.edc.uri.edu/rigis/.
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3.3 Brownfield density index
Many hedonic analyses apply difference-in-differences, where proximity to a changing
amenity or disamenity define treatment and properties beyond a certain distance threshold are
control units. However, in instances in which the attribute of interest is densely distributed and
households can be impacted by multiple treatments, a simple distance variable is unlikely to
sufficiently capture exposure. In our sample of 225 brownfields, 55% are within 0.5 km of
another brownfield, 79% are within 1.0 km of another brownfield, and 92% are within 2.0 km of
another brownfield. Because the spatial extent of effect is unknown, identifying a clear control
group for most of our sample is difficult, and a difference-in-differences methodology is less
appropriate than a continuous measure of exposure.
To measure exposure in our setting, we develop a brownfield density index (BDI) that
can incorporate multiple, proximate brownfields. BDI assigns each transaction a continuous
value that weights the proximity to remediated brownfields based upon the inverse distance to a
transaction. Closer brownfields carry more weight, while those further away contribute less. This
construction follows Linn (2013), who examined the similarly dense brownfield area of Chicago.
We calculate several measures of BDI. The first, which is the key independent variable
for most of our analyses, is the sum of the inverse distances to all brownfields within 2 km that
are remediated prior to the transaction.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = �
𝐽𝐽

1
∙ 1�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 � ∙ 1�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j < 2𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j

(1)

where J indexes all brownfields in our sample, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the distance between house transaction i

and brownfield j, and we limit the range of influence to be 2 km. 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 is the date of transaction for

housing transaction i, and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 is the date of completed remediation for brownfield j. Numerical

examples help translate BDI into real experience. BDI would equal one if a single brownfield

located 1 km from a house was remediated prior to the house’s transaction. Alternatively, if a
house was 2 km from two brownfields that were remediated before the transaction, then BDI
would also be one. Since the relationship with distance is inverse, a house located just .1 km
from a remediated brownfield would have a BDI of 10. Due to the inverse nature, observations
far from brownfields have a disproportionately small influence on estimating the relationship
between remediation and housing prices, and as a result altering the 2 km cutoff does not
qualitatively change results.
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Second, we develop three BDI measures that distinguish time since remediation in order
to allow heterogeneity in the effect on house prices over time. For example, remediation may be
an immediate negative impact on nearby property values due to information revelation, but this
effect may become zero or even positive as more time passes as households adjust to the
situation and value the improvement. The first of the three measures is the density of remediated
brownfields occurring less than six months before housing transaction i:
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_0_6𝑖𝑖 = �
𝐽𝐽

1
∙ 1 �𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∈ (𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 , 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 6�� ∙ 1�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j < 2𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j

(2)

where and 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 + 6 is six months after brownfield j is remediated. The second and third BDI
measures in this group use time windows of 6-18 months and more than 18 months.

Lastly, we create a time-invariant measure of brownfield density that captures the sum of
inverse distances to all brownfields, regardless of remediation status.
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 = �
𝐽𝐽

1
∙ 1�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j < 2𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j

(3)

We use this variable (in a specification that includes 𝐵𝐵𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ) to test the effect of unremediated

brownfields on property prices. More details on model specifications are given in Section 4.

3.4 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics that explain the data and illustrate the setting. In
addition to brownfield and housing characteristics, we include Census 2000 block group data to
understand resident characteristics. 14 Column 1 presents basic means. The average BDI of a
transacting property is 1.979, while average BDI total is 4.528 indicating that the average
transaction is around both remediated and unremediated brownfields. The average sales price is
$248,583, with just over a quarter-acre lot and just under 1,500 square feet of living area. The
average median family income across neighborhoods in our sample is $47,210. On average,
26.4% of our sample has a college degree and 11.2% are black or Hispanic.
Column 2 compares our sample observations and neighborhoods to out-of-sample areas,
namely transactions during the same time frame that are more than 2 km from any brownfield.
The results show that out-of-sample houses sell for over $75,000 more, have two-thirds of an

14

Summary statistics for all variables used in regressions are available in Table A2 of the online appendix.
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acre larger lot size, more living area, and are more likely to have central AC than in-sample
houses. Further, out-of-sample residents have a larger family income by $9,178, are 4.6
percentage points more likely to have a college degree, and are 5.4 percentage points less likely
to be non-white.
Columns 3 and 4 assess correlations between the housing and neighborhood
characteristics and BDI. Each variable was separately regressed on BDI, and in Column 4 block
group fixed effects were additionally included. Column 3 shows that BDI has strong,
unconditional correlations with nearly all the housing and neighborhood characteristics. The
correlations suggest that houses with high BDI have lower sales prices, smaller lots, less central
AC and fewer bathrooms. Additionally, residents in high BDI areas have lower income, are less
likely to have gone to college, and are more likely to be non-white. All of these correlations are
consistent with intuition about environmental disamenities and environmental injustice. A
concern is that if there are observable differences between high and low BDI areas, there may
also be unobservable differences that bias regression estimates. However, when controlling for
block group fixed effects, most correlations other than price become statistically insignificant or
much smaller in magnitude. Our preferred regression specifications include block group fixed
effects (or property fixed effects), which mitigates fears of unobservable variables biasing
estimates.

4 METHODOLOGY
We use the hedonic price method to estimate the effects of brownfield remediation on
proximate housing prices. Our basic specification is:
ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝜑𝜑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(4)

where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the sales price of transaction i, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is as defined in Equation (1), 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a set of

housing, location, and temporal controls and will be discussed in detail below, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error

term. 𝛽𝛽 is the coefficient of interest and measures the effect of density of remediated brownfields
on housing prices. As discussed in the introduction, we interpret 𝛽𝛽 as the combination of

household valuation of environmental improvement and any consequence resulting from new
information derived by remediation by households, lenders, or developers. Assuming valuation
of environmental improvement is positive and new disclosure of old contamination is negative, a
positive 𝛽𝛽 would suggest household valuation of environmental improvement overwhelms any
13

negative effect of new information. Whereas a negative 𝛽𝛽 may be interpreted as the negative
impact of information revelation being larger than the valuation.

First, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 includes structural housing characteristics (e.g., bedrooms, bathrooms) and

measures of spatially-referenced attributes (e.g., distance to the coast, distance to pre-2003

CERCLIS sites). Second, to guard against spatially correlated unobserved variables, we include
fixed effects for each Census block group, of which there are 616 in our sample with an average
of 71.1 observations per block group. Third, the time span of our study includes the boom and
bust of the housing market (see Figure A2 in the online appendix for the overall time trend
observed), and we include month-year fixed effects to negate any correlation between
macroeconomic conditions and remediation activity.
However, recent research has shown that the boom-bust cycle was not uniform across
space, even for neighborhoods within the same state or metropolitan area (Kuminoff and Pope
2013). Further, Landvoigt et al. (2015) find that lower tier neighborhoods appreciated much
more than upper tier neighborhoods in the boom part of the cycle, and that this was driven by the
expansion of lending to subprime credit households. In our data, we find similar price dynamics
(see Figures A3a and A3b in the online appendix). Given that properties and neighborhoods with
high BDI tend to have lower sales prices and lower incomes, these differential price movements
pose a challenge to identification.
To account for these predictable, differential price trends across segments of the housing
market, we include three additional sets of variables in 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 . First, we include town-year fixed

effects to non-parametrically control for differing boom-bust cycles across the 35 towns in our
sample. Second, we calculate the number of foreclosures occurring by year and block group and
include this as an independent variable. Third, we calculate average pre-sample (January 2000December 2002) house prices for each census tract and interact this continuous variable with
year-quarter fixed effects. This set of variables controls for different price segments of the
market evolving differently. 15 In a robustness check, we alternatively control for propertyspecific pre-sample price interacted with year-quarter fixed effects, similar to Bajari et al. (2012).

15

Linn (2013) also includes pre-sample mean neighborhood prices interacted with time fixed effects, however, his
motivation is to control for reverse causality. He argues that because property values incorporate expected future
changes in value, including these variables will control for unobserved neighborhood trends.
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In addition to Equation (4), we estimate models allow the effect of remediation to change
in the time since remediation:
ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽1 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_0_6𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_6_18𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_18𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝜑𝜑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(5)

where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_0_6𝑖𝑖 is as defined in Equation (2) and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_6_18𝑖𝑖 and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵_18𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 are defined

analogously.

In Equations (4) and (5), identification comes from within block group variation. While
these are small geographic areas, there could still be a concern that there are unobserved
variables that vary within block groups and are correlated with both house prices and BDI. We
employ two additional models to guard against this bias. First, we estimate a repeat sales model
and include property specific fixed effects:
ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜑𝜑 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(6)

where t denotes the time of sale. This model will capture all time-invariant spatial variables, but
at the expense of losing 60% of our observations. Second, in an effort to capture unobserved
variables correlated with BDI, we add BDI total, defined in Equation (3), to Equation (5):
ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝜑𝜑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(7)

Not only does the inclusion of BDI total improve the identification of 𝛽𝛽, but the interpretation of

𝛾𝛾 can provide insights into the disamenity value of proximity to unremediated brownfields. 16 If 𝛾𝛾
is negative, this would suggest the community and potential buyers are aware of the brownfield
and its associated risks and value non-proximate houses more. However, if this coefficient is
zero, then the community and potential buyers may not value distance or may not be aware of the
proximate hazards.
Lastly, we estimate variants of Equations (4), (6) and (7) that allow for heterogeneous
impacts of remediation across space. We divide the sample into terciles of low, medium and high
priced neighborhoods based on the average pre-sample (2000-2002) sales prices for each census
tract. We then estimate models that interact indicator variables for each tercile with BDI and BDI
total. These models enable inference into the price impact of remediated and unremediated sites
by neighborhood wealth, which could be correlated with valuation of environmental goods,

16

Instead of the time invariant BDI total, it is tempting to include a measure of BDI for only unremediated
brownfields. The problem with that switch is that BDI and BDI unremediated are highly collinear because
remediation of a brownfield would decrease BDI unremediated and increase BDI by the same amount. As a result,
including BDI unremediated dramatically changes the coefficient on BDI and its interpretation.
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information about environmental goods, and bank lending practices. We then use the differential
price changes to assess distributional impacts.

5 RESULTS
5.1 Basic Results
Table 2 presents a suite of results from various specifications of Equation (4) in Panel A
and Equation (5) in Panel B. Five columns represent five model specifications. Column 1
includes housing and neighborhood characteristics only. Columns 2-5 build on the prior
column’s specification, adding in turn year-month fixed effects, census block group fixed effects,
year-town fixed effects, and pre-sample average house values interacted with year-quarter fixed
effects.
Beginning with Panel A, all coefficients show a negative and statistically significant
effect of brownfield remediation on property values. The coefficient estimates range
from -0.0244 to -0.0100, are all statistically significant at the 1% level, and decrease in
magnitude as more controls are included. Among specifications in this table, Column 5 is our
preferred model because it controls for spatial unobservables, differential housing market
fluctuations by town and by market segment. However, the full suite of results suggests that the
modeling choice does not qualitatively affect the estimated relationship between BDI and prices,
and there is still enough within block group variation to identify the treatment effect. The
estimated coefficients from our preferred model suggests that a one unit increase in BDI yields a
1.0% reduction in house price. This translates into a marginal effect of -1.0% for a single
remediation 1 km away, which would be a $2486 loss in an average house value. The mean
value of BDI in our sample is 1.979, indicating that the average house sold for nearly 2% less
than a house removed from any brownfield remediation, all else equal.
Panel B supports the findings of Panel A, showing statistically significant negative
coefficients across the board. The results further suggest the price impacts of remediation are
immediate and relatively constant as time goes on. The coefficient on BDI 0-6 months in Column
5 is -0.0080, stays nearly identical 6-18 months following remediation, and then grows slightly
to -0.0116 beyond 18 months. Given the immediate nature of price impacts, it seems very
unlikely that preference-based sorting is causing this result because it would take longer for
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populations to turn over. For the remainder of the paper, given the similarity in results, we focus
only on models using BDI as the main independent variable, as in Panel A.
These results contrast with Linn (2013), the most closely related study to ours, and
Haninger et al. (2017), which both find positive property value impacts of brownfield
remediation. Linn (2013) estimates a coefficient of 0.0016 on the density of sites remediated
prior to sale. Haninger et al. (2017) find much larger effects, ranging from 5% to 11% postremediation, when looking at EPA-funded remediated sites. As discussed in the introduction, a
key difference between the EPA sites and Rhode Island’s voluntary program sites is that the EPA
prioritizes community involvement and information availability prior to remediation. In sum, our
results and the differences in programs lend support for the notion that brownfield remediation
leads to new information about the environmental quality to buyers, developers or lenders, and
prices respond negatively to that new information. As we explore extensions to this model, we
will seek more evidence for this interpretation.

5.2 Robustness checks
Table 3 presents a series of specification that test the robustness of the results presented
in Table 2. Column 1 presents results from estimating Equation (6), the repeat sales model, on
the 7,752 properties that transact more than once during our sample time period. The magnitude
of effect grows slightly to -0.0134. Column 2 presents results from estimating Equation (7),
which includes BDI total. The coefficient on BDI is nearly unchanged from Table 2 Column 5.
Both of these results suggest that results are not affected by unobserved variables that vary
within block group and are correlated with both house prices and BDI. The coefficient on BDI
total is small and insignificant, which could indicate that on average there is no disamenity value
of unremediated brownfields. However, given the coefficients on BDI, it seems more plausible to
interpret this statistical zero as evidence that there is no knowledge of unremediated brownfields.
Columns 3 and 4 show results from models that have alternative strategies for controlling
market price segments experiencing the boom-bust cycle differently. Column 3 includes Census
tract by year fixed effects, which provide a more flexible way of controlling for neighborhood
dynamics than town by year fixed effects and pre-sample neighborhood mean prices interacted
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with year-quarter fixed effects. 17 The estimated coefficient on BDI is -0.0085, slightly smaller
than when not using tract-year fixed effect, but still consistent with the basic results. Instead of
modeling how neighborhood prices evolve through the boom-bust cycle, Column 4 uses presample prices of individual properties as predictors of price fluctuations, similar to the strategy
of Bajari et al (2012). Specifically, for sample properties that additionally transact during the
time frame January 2000-Septemeber 2003 (22.5% of the main sample), the pre-sample sales
price is interacted with year-quarter fixed effects. The estimated coefficient on BDI is -0.0187. 18
Both columns suggest the modeling choice for how price segments experience the price cycle are
not consequential for the results.
Columns 5 and 6 modify the definition of BDI by squaring and square rooting inverse
distance to give more or less weight, respectively, to closer brownfields. The interpretation of the
coefficient changes due to the changing units, but both coefficients are negative and statistically
significant, which is consistent with other results. While not shown here, the results are also
robust to modifying the BDI definition to only include brownfields within 1.5 km.
As an additional robustness check, we estimate difference-in-differences models for a
variety of treatment and control distance bins. The results are presented in in Tables A3 and A4
of the online appendix and strongly support the overall findings of negative price changes.

5.3 Heterogeneity by neighborhood average house value
Prices in different types of neighborhoods may respond differently to brownfield
remediation. One source of heterogeneity could be wealth levels of a neighborhood and all that is
correlated with wealth. Conventional wisdom may suggest that wealthier areas are more
informed about environmental amenities, and remediation may not be new (negative)
information. If the site is known to be contaminated, remediation may positively affect housing
prices. Further, wealthier areas may be viewed as a safer investment for development or redevelopment, and thus developers may be less concerned about discovery and remediation of a
brownfield, and prices may not be negatively affected.
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However, only tracts with sufficient observations could be included to identify tract-year fixed effects, otherwise
Stata could not invert the matrices. Thus, only tracts with 200 observations or more were included in this column’s
sample, which results in a loss of 18.4% of the main sample. The results are robust to changing the cutoff of 200.
18
The Bajari et al. (2012) strategy is slightly different; they use the estimated residual from a prior sale to control for
property unobservables. With the same sample used in Column 4 of Table 3, we estimated such a model and the
coefficient on BDI was a statistically significant -0.0278.
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Table 4 presents results from models that allow the house price impact of remediation to
vary by neighborhood price level. We estimate three models: the first similar to the preferred
specification from Table 2, the second adds BDI total, and a repeat sales model. In each
specification, BDI is interacted with indicator variables for low, medium and high price
neighborhood, definitions which are based on pre-sample sales and are time-invariant.
Additionally, in Column 2, BDI total is interacted with the three indicator variables.
The coefficient on BDI in low price neighborhoods ranges from -0.0181 to -0.0208 and is
statistically significant at the 1% level across all three specifications. For medium price
neighborhoods, coefficients on BDI are always negative, but half the magnitude or less of the
effect of BDI in low price areas. In contrast, coefficients on BDI in high price neighborhoods are
twice positive and statistically significant, suggesting prices increase after remediation or at least
do not decrease. In sum, these results reveal substantial and statistically significant heterogeneity
in house price responses to remediation between neighborhoods of different house values. 19
In Column 2, the coefficient estimates on interactions with BDI total also reveal
substantial and statistically significant heterogeneity across neighborhood types. The coefficient
for BDI total in low price neighborhoods is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude,
suggesting that houses located near unremediated brownfields in low price neighborhoods do not
sell for a different price than houses further away. In contrast, the coefficients for BDI total in
medium and high price neighborhoods are negative and statistically significant, with the
coefficient for high price neighborhoods larger in magnitude. This suggests that prices are lower
closer to unremediated brownfields in medium and high price neighborhoods.
If we return to the idea that coefficients on BDI reveal the net impact of valuation and
new information, the coefficients in Table 4 tell an interesting story consistent with the idea that
information is a critical element of price effects. In low price neighborhoods, results suggest that
unremediated brownfields are not known to be a risk. Once remediation occurs, prices of
proximate houses decline, suggesting new information about contamination is negatively
impacting the price new buyers are willing to pay or the amount banks are willing to lend.
However, in high price neighborhoods, results suggest that households possess information about
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An alternative specification that includes BDI as a main effect and BDI interacted with I(medium price
neighborhood) and I(high price neighborhood) was used to test statistical differences in price effects across
neighborhood types. While the two models are essentially identical, we felt presenting results as in Table 4 better
enabled interpretation of coefficients.
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unremediated brownfields and place value on non-proximity. Further, we see prices increase
after remediation, indicating the valuation effect is larger than the new information effect, which
is consistent with households knowing about the brownfield prior to remediation. Interestingly
though, it appears some stigma about the location may remain as coefficents on BDI are equal or
smaller in magnitude than the coefficient on BDI total, suggesting prices do not fully recover
post remediation. In medium price neighborhoods, the results indicate something in between,
that households are at least somewhat aware of existing brownfields, but still prices may still
decline after remediation, though much less than in low price neighborhoods.

5.4 Heterogeneity by contamination type and reuse
One alternative explanation to the heterogeneous price impacts estimated in Table 4 is
that there may be different price impacts by type of contamination or reuse, and contamination
and reuse patterns may be correlated with neighborhood characteristics. To test this, we create
BDI measures specific to each contamination source and each reuse type and then estimate
separate regression including only one source or type at a time. Table 5 reports the results. While
there are differences in magnitude across contamination sources and reuse types, all coefficients
are negative and all but one are statistically significant. These results suggest that correlations
between contamination and reuse patterns and neighborhood characteristics are not driving the
heterogeneity observed in Table 4.

6 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS
In this section, we extend our analysis to think about how Rhode Island’s voluntary
brownfield program impacted households across the distribution of wealth levels. We will
consider welfare as measured by changes in house price proportional to income, which is
commonly used in the literature (Fullerton 2011). Relating impacts to income is similar to
thinking about tax incidence, and whether a tax is progressive or regressive. In the case of the
impact of brownfield remediation, if welfare improves more for low-income households than
high-income households, then the policy is progressive, and regressive if the opposite holds.
In order to calculate our welfare measure, we first multiply sales prices by transaction
specific BDI and by the corresponding coefficient estimate from Column 3 of Table 4, which
yields the total impact of remediation on sales price. This number is then put in annual terms

20

assuming a 5% interest rate and 30-year mortgage. Annualized impacts are averaged by Census
tract and divided by tract median family income from the 2000 Decennial Census to arrive at our
welfare measure. A limitation of this analysis is that it does not account for impacts to renters,
which on average are lower income than homeowners.
Figure 2 plots welfare impacts against log median family income at the tract level. Each
point in the data is given a diameter proportional to the average BDI of all observations within
that tract, thus indicating which neighborhoods experienced more remediation. Immediately clear
from the figure is a positive relationship between income and welfare. The average welfare
impact for each quintile of income, from lowest to highest is: -0.0250, -0.0075, 0.0010, 0.0018,
and 0.0055. These findings suggest a regressive impact of the program.
Given the negative correlation between brownfield prevalence and neighborhood income
observed in Table 1, a program aimed at cleaning and developing brownfields could intuitively
have a disproportionately positive impact on low-income areas. In the context of air quality,
Bento et al. (2015) document a similar correlation between income and environmental quality,
and find that the air quality improvements from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
disproportionately benefited low-income households. More similar to the context of brownfields,
Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013) find that superfund remediation disproportionately
benefited low value homes. In the present case of Rhode Island’s voluntary brownfield program,
however, the empirical evidence suggests a progressive outcome was thwarted by the presence
and heterogeneity of incomplete information.

7 CONCLUSION
This paper examines the external effects of a voluntary brownfield remediation program
in the state of Rhode Island that reduces liability for owners of brownfield sites in exchange for
remediation. There are many perceived benefits to brownfield remediation (e.g., reducing
adverse impacts on human health, reducing urban sprawl, and promoting economic growth in
inner cities), which makes it a popular activity across many policy spheres. Many state and city
governments and the EPA see brownfield remediation as a priority, and indubitably thousands of
cleanups will occur across the United States in the near future.
The empirical findings of this paper suggest that brownfield remediation reduces nearby
property values. There is substantial heterogeneity in the property value impacts over space; we
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find that the overall negative effects are driven by low-income neighborhoods. These findings
lead us to conclude that there is incomplete information about contamination prior to remediation
and discovery of contamination increases concern about nearby properties among current
residents and potential buyers, as well as mortgage lenders and developers.
The unequal and regressive distribution of impacts raises concerns about the popularity of
brownfield remediation programs. Future research should strive to understand how individual
programs and policies can be altered to avoid unintended consequences. Comparing our results
to those of Haninger et al. (2017) suggests that external funding and community involvement
may be critical for positive outcomes to be realized, and this supports the institutional
understanding of experts at the EPA (Cooper et al. 2015). Interestingly, Rhode Island held and
passed referendums in the 2014 and 2016 elections that provide a combined $10 million of
matching grants for new brownfield remediation project costs. We are interested to see if this
funding can alleviate the problems observed with the program thus far, but would additionally
encourage community outreach and information dissemination to be coupled with this funding.
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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variables

BDI
BDI total
Sales price (2013$)
Lot size (acres)
Living area (square feet)
Central AC (1=yes)
Number of bathrooms
Median family income
Proportion college graduate
Proportion non-white

In-sample
mean
(std. dev.)

In vs. out of
sample
(std. error)

Relationship
with BDI
(std. error)

(1)
1.979
(2.883)
4.528
(4.724)
248,583
(184,593)
0.282
(0.604)
1,480
(622)
0.257
(0.437)
1.665
(0.704)
47,210
(16,728)
0.264
(0.168)
0.112
(0.155)

(2)

(3)

-75,225**
(2,144)
-0.671**
(0.012)
-166.7**
(5.2)
-0.087**
(0.003)
-0.187**
(0.005)
-9,178**
(122)
-0.046**
(0.001)
0.054**
(0.001)

-7,938**
(303)
-0.022**
(0.001)
-0.887
(1.031)
-0.014**
(0.001)
-0.015**
(0.001)
-1,322**
(26)
-0.005**
(0.001)
0.020**
(0.001)

Relationship
with BDI, with
block group FE
(std. error)
(4)

-6,544**
(1,785)
-0.001
(0.001)
2.177
(3.389)
-0.002*
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.003)

Notes: BDI is the sum of the inverse distances to all brownfields within 2km of a housing transaction that were
remediated prior to the transaction. BDI total is a time invariant measure that equals the sum of the inverse distances to
all brownfields within 2km of a housing transaction, regardless of remediation status. Median income, proportion of
college graduates and proportion non-white come from the 2000 Decennial Census at the block group level. For
Column 2, variables were regressed on an indicator for in-sample. For Columns 3 and 4, variables were regressed on
BDI, and, in Column 4, block group fixed effects. In each of Columns 2-4, the regression coefficient and standard error
are displayed. Sample size is 43,787 for columns 1, 3 and 4 and is 78,415 for column 2. * and ** indicate significance at
5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2 : The Effect of Brownfield Remediation on Housing Prices
Variables
Panel A: total effect of remediation
BDI
Adjusted R-squared
Panel B: effect of remediation split by time
horizon
BDI 0-6 months
BDI 6-18 months
BDI 18 or more months
Adjusted R-squared
Housing and neighborhood characteristics
Year-month FE
Census Block Group FE
Town X Year FE
Pre-sample mean price X year-quarter FE
Observations

Dependent Variable: Log Sales Price
(2)
(3)
(4)

(1)

(5)

-0.0249***
(0.0041)
0.597

-0.0183***
(0.0038)
0.704

-0.0128***
(0.0033)
0.717

-0.0119***
(0.0031)
0.733

-0.0100***
(0.0027)
0.737

-0.0294***
(0.0050)
-0.0221***
(0.0077)
-0.0245***
(0.0043)
0.591
Yes
No
No
No
No
43,787

-0.0158***
(0.0043)
-0.0146***
(0.0051)
-0.0193***
(0.0042)
0.703
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
43,787

-0.0110***
(0.0041)
-0.0102**
(0.0042)
-0.0147***
(0.0040)
0.716
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
43,787

-0.0094**
(0.0039)
-0.0085**
(0.0036)
-0.0142***
(0.0037)
0.733
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
43,787

-0.0080**
(0.0038)
-0.0077**
(0.0033)
-0.0116***
(0.0033)
0.736
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
43,787

Notes: Each column of each panel results from a separate regression. In Panel A, BDI is the sum of the inverse distances to all brownfields within 2km of a housing
transaction that were remediated prior to the transaction. In Panel B, a remediated brownfield only enters the BDI measure if it occurs in the time span specified by the
variable. Housing and neighborhood characteristics include lot size, living area, house age bins, bedrooms, full bathrooms, half bathrooms, floors, parking spaces, total
rooms, fireplaces, pool, central air conditioning, water view, and distance to the nearest: coastline, lake, river, village center, downtown Providence, industrial area,
impoverished area, and pre-sample CERCLIS site. Pre-sample mean prices are census tract average sales prices for pre-sample years 2001-2003. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the block group level. *, ** and *** indicate
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks

Variables

BDI

Repeat sales
(1)
-0.0134***
(0.0031)

BDI total
Housing and neighborhood characteristics
Year-month FE
Census Block Group FE
Town X Year FE
Pre-sample mean price X year-quarter FE
Property FE
Tract X year FE
Pre-sample sales price X year-quarter FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
17,506
0.859

Include
timeinvariant
BDI total
(2)
-0.0103***
(0.0023)
-0.0004
(0.0021)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
43,787
0.723

Dependent Variable: Log Sales Price
Use distance
Pre-sample
Tract X year
squared in
sales price as
FE
BDI
predictor
calculation
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.0085**
-0.0187***
-0.0022***
(0.0035)
(0.0031)
(0.0004)

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
35,711
0.717

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
9,836
0.789

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
43,742
0.723

Use root
distance in
BDI
calculation
(6)
-0.0190***
(0.0023)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
43,787
0.724

Notes: The Column 1 sample includes only properties that transact more than once, and the model includes property-specific fixed effects. Column 2 includes as an
independent variable BDI total, which is the sum of the inverse distances to all brownfields, remediated and unremediated, within 2km of a housing transaction. Column 3
adds Census Tract by year fixed effects to the Table 2 Column 5 specification and removes year-town FEs and pre-sample neighborhood mean price interacted with yearquarter FEs. Column 3 only includes tracts with more than 200 observations in the sample. The Column 4 sample includes only properties that transacted January 2000September 2003 as well as the sample time frame October 2003-March 2013; then the pre-sample sales price (inflation adjusted and logged) is interacted with year-quarter
fixed effects. For Columns 5 and 6, the definition of BDI is altered. Modifying Equation (1) to have an exponent on inverse distance, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = ∑𝐽𝐽(

1

𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j

)𝑝𝑝 ∙ 1�𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 > 𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗 � ∙

1�𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,j < 2𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘�, Column 5 sets p=2 and Column 6 sets p=0.5, as compared to the main results that set p=1. Squaring inverse distance produces a distribution of BDI with a
long right tail; Column 5 drops transactions in the top 0.1% of the BDI distribution to reduce influence of outliers. See Table 2 for more details.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects of Brownfield Remediation by Neighborhood Value
Dependent Variable: Log Sales Price
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.0208*** -0.0205*** -0.0181***
(0.0024)
(0.0024)
(0.0037)
-0.0078**
-0.0024
-0.0092*
(0.0040)
(0.0037)
(0.0049)
-0.0010
0.0070**
0.0115*
(0.0019)
(0.0030)
(0.0059)
0.0023
(0.0019)
-0.0079**
(0.0039)
-0.0101***
(0.0034)
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
43,787
43,787
17,506
0.724
0.724
0.860

Variables
BDI X I(low price neighborhood)
BDI X I(medium price neighborhood)
BDI X I(high price neighborhood)
BDI total X I(low price neighborhood)
BDI total X I(medium price neighborhood)
BDI total X I(high price neighborhood)
Census block group FE
Property FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

Notes: Each column shows a single regression. Each regression includes housing and neighborhood characteristics,
year-month fixed effects, year-town fixed effects, and neighborhood pre-sample mean price interacted with yearquarter fixed effects. In columns 1 and 2, the sample is identical to Table 2. In Column 3, only properties transacting
more than once are included. Neighborhoods (defined by census block groups) are sorted into three categories of
low, medium and high house prices based on average sales price for January 2000-September 2003. I(low price
neighborhood), I(medium price neighborhood) and I(high price neighborhood) are indicator variables based on that
categorization. "X" indicates an interaction between two variables. See Table 2 for more details.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Brownfield Remediation by Contamination Source and Reuse Type
Panel A: Contamination Source
BDI

Panel B: Reuse Type
BDI

Historical
(1)
-0.0073**
(0.0033)

Synthetic compounds
(2)
-0.0064
(0.0041)

Petroleum
(3)
-0.0089**
(0.0044)

Other
(4)
-0.0162***
(0.0034)

Commercial
(5)
-0.0089**
(0.0035)

Residential
(6)
-0.0069**
(0.0032)

Industrial
(7)
-0.0205***
(0.0050)

Other
(8)
-0.0217***
(0.0038)

Notes: Each column of each panel represents a separate regression, each with only one type of brownfield included in the calculation of BDI.
For this table, BDI is calculated as the sum of inverse distances for all remediated brownfields of that type at the time of sale. "Historical"
indicates a site of past manufacturing. "Synthetic compounds" include heavy metals and polychlorinated biphenyls. "Residential" includes
both housing and schools. For contamination, "Other" either indicates that the contamination was unknown or there were too few instances of
that type to form a group. For reuse, "Other" either indicates that there were too few instances of that type to form a group or there was no
reuse occurring. All models include all controls used in Column 5 of Table 2 and have a sample size of 43,787. See Table 2 in the main text
for more details.
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Figure 1: Hedonic price schedule for environmental quality
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Figure 2: Distributional impacts of brownfield remediation
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Log median family income

11.5
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Notes: Using results from Column 3 of Table 4, sales prices are multiplied by BDI and by the corresponding
coefficient estimate to arrive at the total impact of remediation on sales price. This number is then put in annual
terms assuming a 5% interest rate and 30-year mortgage. Annualized impacts are averaged by Census tract and
divided by tract median family income from the 2000 Decennial Census to arrive at the y-axis value. Only tracts
with 50 or more transactions in the sample are plotted (N=163, representing 98.4% of the main sample). Circle
diameter is proportional to the average BDI of all observations within a tract, thus larger circles indicate
neighborhoods that experienced more remediation. The mean of log median family income is 10.76, which
translates into $47,210, and this appears as a vertical line on the graph.
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Online Appendix

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND ADVERSE IMPACTS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
Corey Lang and Patrick Cavanagh
University of Rhode Island
(not for publication)

This appendix provides information, data, and results that supplement, but are not critical
to, the analysis in our main paper.
Figure A1 shows the geographic distribution of the 225 sample brownfields.
Figure A2 shows the average sales price trend for our sample. This plot reveals the
increase in prices at the beginning of our sample period and the sharp downward trend at the
onset of the housing crisis.
Figures A3a and A3b show neighborhood average price changes as a function of initial
prices for the boom period 2002-2006 and the bust period 2006-2011, respectively. During 20022006, low price neighborhoods increased in value about 20 percentage points more than high
price neighborhoods. During 2006-2011, those low price neighborhoods experienced far greater
price declines. These findings motivate inclusion of average pre-sample house prices by tract
interacted with year-quarter fixed effects.
Table A1 gives frequency counts for contamination source and reuse type for our sample
of 225 brownfields.
Table A2 gives sample means and standard deviations for all independent variables
included in our hedonic regressions.

Difference-in-differences
One concern about the main results is that the dose-response modeling strategy could be
driving the results. Difference-in-differences is a commonly applied research design and is
typically better suited to modeling a counterfactual that standard linear regression. Thus, it
makes sense to apply that here. The basic difference-in-differences model is:

1

ln(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ) = 𝛽𝛽1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝_𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖
+𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 𝜑𝜑 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖

(𝐴𝐴1)

Given the close proximity of brownfields to each other and that they are remediated at different
times, it is not straightforward to define treatment and control and pre and post, and we decided
to anchor those definitions on the nearest brownfield. We define the treatment group as
properties for which the nearest brownfield is less than 0.5 km away. The control group is
defined as properties for which the nearest brownfield is between 1 and 2 km away. We omit
properties for which the nearest brownfield is between 0.5 and 1 km away with the intent to
create more contrast between treatment and control. We define post remediation as a binary
variable equal to one if the nearest brownfield has been remediated and zero otherwise.
Panel A of Table A3 presents results from two difference-in-differences models, one
cross sectional and one repeat sales, and only giving the coefficient on the key interaction term
of the model (𝛽𝛽3 from Equation A1). The coefficients are similar to the main results in that they
are negative and highly statistically significant. The magnitudes are substantially larger, but the
interpretation is different. While the variables are binary, treatment likely often involves being
proximate to several brownfields due to the clustered nature of brownfields in our sample. These
results suggest that the main results are not being driven by the modeling strategy.
Panel B estimates the same models as Panel A, but uses only transactions that have a
single brownfield within 2 km. These are isolated brownfields, and thus represent the cleanest
treatment and control. Results here suggest a positive impact of remediation. While at first blush
this appears to contradict our main findings and raises questions about our empirical strategy, the
isolated brownfields occur in wealthier areas and these coefficients are consistent with the high
price neighborhood results from Table 4. Thus, we do not view the Panel B results as valid
treatment effects for the whole program.
Table A4 supports the difference-in-differences analysis presented in Table A3. Table A4
varies the distance bins used for definition of treatment and control. Results are qualitatively
identical to Table 6 and consistent with the main results.
Difference-in-differences models that interact key variables with low, medium, and high
price neighborhood indicator variables reveal similar price effects as those found in Table 4
further supporting this conclusion.
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Figure A1: Remediated Brownfield Sites, 2003-2013
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Figure A2: Sales Price Trends over Sample Period
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Notes: Sales prices were first regressed on month fixed effects to remove predictable annual
variation. Sample size is 43,787.
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Figure A3a: Average Neighborhood Price Changes, 2002-2006
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Figure A3b: Average Neighborhood Price Changes, 2006-2011
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Notes: Average prices are determined for all sample neighborhoods, defined as Census Tracts, with at least 10
observations in each of 2002, 2006 and 2011. The x-axis, log price, is the log of the average neighborhood sales
price. The y-axis, price ratio, is the average neighborhood sales price in the later year divided by the earlier year.
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Table A1: Transition Frequency from Contamination to Re-use

Type of
contamination

Historical
Synthetic
Petroleum
Other
Total

Commercial
41
16
19
19
95

Type of Re-use
Residential
Industrial
28
21
8
11
4
4
16
4
56
40

Other
18
7
6
3
34

Total
108
42
33
42
225

Notes: Each cell represents the number of remediated brownfields that are of the given type of contamination and the given type of
reuse. "Historical" indicates a site of past manufacturing. "Synthetic" stands for synthetic compounds and includes heavy metals
and polychlorinated biphenyls. "Residential" includes both housing and schools. For contamination, "Other" either indicates that
the contamination was unknown or there were too few instances of that type to form a group. For reuse, "Other" either indicates
that there were too few instances of that type to form a group or there was no reuse occurring.
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Table A2: Housing and Neighborhood Summary Statistics
Standard
deviation
248585
184594
1.98
2.88
0.23
0.71
0.42
1.16
1.34
2.31
4.53
4.72
0.28
0.60
1.29
0.68
0.26
0.50
3.03
0.79
1.46
0.63
0.42
0.52
0.08
0.32
14.81
6.22
6.17
1.50
3.05
1.40
0.04
0.19
0.26
0.44
0.00
0.04
3.97
3.94
1.68
1.01
14.08
12.43
1.08
0.69
5.46
5.49
2.35
2.42
0.67
0.56
3.15
6.52
1.38
0.75
43,787
Mean

Sale Price ($2013)
BDI
BDI 0-6 months
BDI 6-18 months
BDI 18+ months
BDI total
Lot Size (acres)
Number of floors
Number of fireplaces
Number of bedrooms
Number of full bathrooms
Number of half bathrooms
Number of parking spots
Living Area (100's sq. ft.)
Total number of rooms
House age at sale
pool (1=yes)
Central Air Conditioning (1=yes)
View of water (1=yes)
Distance to nearest highway exit (km)
Distance to nearest village (km)
Distance to downtown Providence (km)
Distance to nearest lake (km)
Distance to the coast (km)
Distance to nearest river (km)
Distance to nearest Industrial area (km)
Distance to nearest Enterprise Zone (km)
Distance to nearest CERCLIS site (km)
Sample size
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Table A3: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of Brownfield Remediation on
Housing Prices
Dependent Variable: Log Sales Price
Repeat sales
Cross section
(1)
(2)
Panel A: All Brownfields
Treatment*Post remediation
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Panel B: Only Isolated Brownfields
Treatment*Post remediation
Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Housing and neighborhood characteristics
Year-month FE
Census Block Group FE
Town X Year FE
Pre-sample mean price X year-quarter FE
Property FE

-0.0458***
(0.0131)

-0.0859***
(0.0240)

27,817
0.728

10,798
0.838

0.0741*
(0.0412)

0.0749
(0.0565)

8,843
0.703
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

3,032
0.862
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: This table presents results of four difference-in-differences regression models, each of which regress
log sales price on Treatment, Post remediation, their interaction, and a suite of control variables listed at the
bottom of the table. Only coefficients for the interaction are shown. Treatment is binary and equals 1 when
a property is within 0.5 km of a brownfield site. Treatment equals 0 when the nearest brownfield to a
property is between 1 and 2 km. Properties are excluded if the nearest brownfield is between 0.5 and 1 km.
Post remediation is binary and equals 1 if the transaction occurs after the nearest brownfield is remediated
and 0 otherwise. Panel B only includes properties that have only a single brownfield within 2 km. See Table
2 for more details.
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Table A4: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of Effect of Brownfield Remediation on Housing
Prices, varying distances that define treatment and control
Treatment distance band (km):
Control distance band (km):
Panel A: All Brownfields
Treatment*Post remediation
Observations
R-squared
Panel B: Only Isolated Brownfields
Treatment*Post remediation
Observations
R-squared

Dependent Variable: Log Sales Price
0-0.5
0-0.5
0-0.75
0-0.3
1-2
0.5-2
1-2
1-2
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.0458***
(0.0131)

-0.0258**
(0.0106)

-0.0384***
(0.0102)

-0.0538***
(0.0208)

27,817
0.7276

43,827
0.7232

36,316
0.7275

22,813
0.7244

0.0741*
(0.0412)

0.0687*
(0.0369)

0.0403
(0.0255)

0.1341
(0.0963)

8,843
0.7029

10,720
0.6943

9,685
0.7031

8,575
0.7019

Notes: This table presents eight regression results of Equation A1. For each column, the distance bands that define
treatment and control are different and are listed at the top of each column. For example, in column 1, treatment equals 1
when a property is within 0.5 km of a brownfield site, treatment equals 0 when the nearest brownfield to a property is
between 1 and 2 km, and properties are excluded if the nearest brownfield is between 0.5 and 1 km. Post remediation is
binary and equals 1 if the transaction occurs after the nearest brownfield is remediated and 0 otherwise. Panel B only
includes properties that have only a single brownfield within 2 km. See Table 2 in the main text for more details.
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